|
|
|
Oxford, Wednesday September 17, 2003
Dr. David R. Young, Oxford Analytica's Managing Director, addressing the opening plenary in 2003.
The Opening Plenary of the Oxford Analytica International Conference in September 2003 addressed the question of 'US Power: How long will it last?' with a number of speakers commenting on aspects of this question.
To introduce the subject, Dr. Nigel Bowles (Fellow and Tutor in Politics, St Anne's College, University of Oxford) looked at the sources of US Foreign Policy and the component parts of US power. He was followed by Dr. Trevor McCrisken (Visiting Fellow, Rothermere American Institute, University of Oxford and Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick) who put forward three possible scenarios for US policy over the next three to five years.
Below is an edited transcript of these two speeches. The plenary went on to examine how these scenarios would be perceived around the world - from the point of view of Western Europe; Eastern Europe; Latin America and Asia. If you are interested in the full transcript of the Opening Plenary please contact the Conference Manager.
I want to say a few words about the sources and developments of American Foreign Policy. I am proposing to do so by the means of asking four questions. Firstly, what is the broad framework within which American Foreign Policy has been formed; secondly, how American Foreign Policy is expressed within that framework; thirdly, how international politics in the post Cold-War era are to be contrasted with those in the Cold-War era; and fourthly, what might be some of the consequences for US security policy.
Firstly, then, what is the broad framework within which American Foreign Policy has been formed? I am going to make some simple propositions in each of these cases because with only ten minutes at my disposal, nine now, I have no time for development. So I am going to make propositions in the hope and expectation that colleagues will want to disagree.
It's probably not necessary to remind an audience as distinguished as this of President John Quincy Adams', himself the son of a President of the United States, declaration that America was the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all but the champion and vindicator only of her own. And there is a nice tension in that claim which I think is quite helpful as a starting point for thinking about some of these issues. The broad framework, as Quincy Adams' observation suggests, comprises two forces whose relationship has varied in character and prominence over time but which have never disappeared and which, I think, are apparent today. The first as a would-be perfector of its own democracy, the second as, to use a now unfortunately incorrect phrase, a crusader imposing itself and sometimes imposing its democracy upon other states. Those two forces are sometimes understood as isolationist and sometimes as internationalist impulses, but in fact, as Adams' claim suggests, I think they are rather more nuanced and subtle and complex than that simple division might suggest.
Secondly, how is US Foreign Policy expressed through that framework? Well I think first as an unresolved tension between elements of isolation and elements of involvement; between the staying of military force and its deployment, for example. Secondly that tension is apparent not just over time or between presidencies, as is sometimes supposed because American history is commonly and conveniently (I think commonly because conveniently) divided into presidential phases. But I think the tension is often apparent within them and I think that was true, for example, of Theo Roosevelt's presidency as it was true of Woodrow Wilson's. It was certainly true of Franklin Roosevelt's, I think it was true of Richard Nixon's and it is most certainly true of George Bush's presidency. These are the presidents who came into office declaring that America was over-extended and before the end of his first term has very considerably increased that extension.
How are international politics in this strange era in which we live to be contrasted with those of the Cold War? Well let's remind ourselves of what the central characteristic was of the Cold War from 1947 to 1990. It was, I take it, bi-polarity, by which I mean that all significant political relationships between states and non-state actors were functions of that central bi-polarite relationship between the United States and the USSR. And bi-polarity gave rise to three driving conditions of international politics.
Firstly, although it didn't always seem so at the time, the fundamental stability of the core relationship between the super powers expressed most vividly, though not exclusively, in the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The breadth of international violence was inherent in the relationship, defined by two super-powers each possessing second-strike strategic nuclear capabilities against the other. But the fact of inter-state violence was confined, and exclusively confined, to super-power's proxy engagements between their client states, acknowledged or not.
Bi-polarity, secondly, gave rise to relative certainty about the risks and rewards in the core relationship because of the explicit linkage between doctrines of conventional war and nuclear deterrents. That point is perhaps expressed in slightly tabloid headline form as United States troops having been employed in huge numbers in West Germany in the 1950's, 60's and 70's as being hostages, which effectively they were, by linking indissolubly the security of Western Europe to that of Chicago.
Thirdly, bi-polarity gave rise decisively, and this is my fundamental point on this phase, to the system being self-regulatory. Threats to the system's equilibrium came to be managed through a relationship we might term 'minimally sufficient confidence' not I think 'trust', but 'minimally sufficient confidence' between the major participants and it was simplified by the paraphernalia of Cold War management and hot line communications, international summits, test ban, ABM and strategic weapons limitation treaties and agreements. By contract the central characteristic of the post-Cold War period from 1990 to the present and beyond is the displacement of bi-polarity by what we might term a complex multi-polarity. There is a single dominant power, most certainly, in the United States but not, I think, contrary to what is often claimed, a hedonic power and if that was not entirely apparent six months ago, I think it is rather more apparent today. The international security system is best characterised as one which has given rise to, firstly, instability, because strategic relationships between major nuclear powers are not as they once were, the primary determinants of international equilibrium or a threat to it. There is no single core relationship any longer between potential enemies founded upon strategic equivalents conducive to stability. That was the case between 1947 and 1990, and it has no successor regime.
Secondly, it has given rise to relative uncertainty about foreign and national security policy because the assumptions of rationality which underpinned the risks and rewards in that former order have been disrupted by terrorism and the prospect of terrorism. Bi-polarity in essence dealt in the currency of tradeable and bargainable goods. The issues were clear, capacities were known down to the last warhead. Issues were fundamentally tradeable and it issued an equilibrium. Islamic terrorism does not, not yet at least, appear to deal or have any prospect in the short term of dealing in tradeable goods.
Thirdly, and most disturbingly, I think, it has lead to the security system being exceptionally resistant to regulation and management. The state system in the first and second worlds continues to be significantly regulated and managed but non-state threats to the system's equilibrium are potent and resistant to such regulation. They are impervious to management, to inducement and to institutionalisation. Rational conversation and exchange is, if not precluded, at least exceptionally difficult. 'Minimally sufficient confidence', which underpinned the former regime, is absolutely absent.
Fourthly then, what are the consequences for US Foreign Policy? Well, President John Quincy Adams' declaration indicates, as I have said, the duality of American attitudes towards foreign policy. On one hand some have indeed understood America as a would-be perfector of democracy within its own borders, showing a warmly encouraging light to other nations and aspirant nations. On other hand, it has also been understood as a crusader in Kissinger's term. And that duality persists, but it is plainly doing so in circumstances very different from those which most of those now making policy have known for the bulk of their professional careers. During the Cold Ward the simplicity of bi-polarity led to a remarkable stability not least because the consequences of miscalculation were grave, immediate and potentially fatal to the globe. No simple replacement has emerged. The Balkans and Somalia indeed exposed as bogus the notion that the United States became an hedonic power following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
September 2001 confirmed that which the first eleven years of the post-war world had already shown. We are dealing with the post-1990 world as well as a post-2001 world. So the world is now a complex multi-polarity in which non-state actors poor in assets but apparently focused in their values have the capacity and the will to strike deep at state actors rich in assets but democratically plural in their values. Just as the Cold War produced insecurities of victory, so the post-Cold War world, I argue, since 1990 rather than 2001 has multiplied and intensified those insecurities and made more difficult their management.
How does the duality of the United States foreign policy express itself in this world where we are subject to such unprecedented security threats from non-state actors and where the United States and its allies and their interests are high-value targets? Well, John Quincy Adams' declaration did not resolve that tension for the United States in the 19th century nor, in my view, is it resolvable. It is the tension which is the fuel of the American foreign policy dynamic and which at present expresses itself against international institutions, against international legal obligations, but for a more robustly unilateralist assertion of its interests. That's a complex and problematic mix. In a complex multi-polar world I think that expression is unlikely to be more than temporary, indeed we may already be seeing its end phase. A phase that is a moving adjustment to threats which are quite exceptional, both in their fluidity and in their capacity to disrupt vital interests and to destabilize existing assumptions whether of academics or of politicians or civil servants, about the international system.
I think that's probably enough provocation. Thank you very much.
I am going to say a few things about the contemporary challenges to US power and what the fundamentals of US foreign policy are. I will then move on to the rather more difficult task of speculating about the future and laying out the three scenarios that we have come up with within Oxford Analytica for the possible future of United States foreign policy.
The degree to which the US can project and utilise it's powers in international affairs over the next three to five years will be largely dependent on how successfully the Bush administration, or indeed its possible successor, can manage, if not control, the complexities and unpredictability of global threats in the post-Cold War world that Nigel has just laid out. These complexities and unpredictabilities were brought into sharp focus, I think, two years ago by the attacks of September 11, 2001. They have lead to a re-assertion of US power globally, yet they have also highlighted the vulnerability of American power and its limited ability to achieve its major objectives of providing security for the United States and stability and order for the rest of the world. Now the way these challenges are met over the coming years will be dependent not only on international events but also on the way in which the unresolved tensions in US policy making that Nigel also identified, play out among American policy makers.
Now there are few constants, I think, in international relations today in which we can reliably anchor our future scenarios. In large part, this reflects the new risks and developments confronting the United States and I think it's worth briefly reminding ourselves of what some of those threats and some of those risks are.
Anti-US and anti-Western Islamist terrorism are real threats to US national territory and interests, and Osama Bin Laden and other key terrorists figures remain at large. The United States is involved in a possibly destabilising engagement in Iraq and this has greatly reduced the ability of the US military to deal with new crises elsewhere. US relations with France and Germany, the so-called Old Europe, are more strained than at any time in recent memory and the Israeli/Palestinian arena for peace is in ruins amid terrorist outrages and bloody retaliation from Israel. Washington and Pyong Yang are locked into a dangerous confrontation over North Korea's nuclear programme. The Taliban and other disruptive figures from the conflict in Afghanistan are again challenging the unstable status quo in that country. And the ability of the US economy, on top of all these things, to continue to be the engine of global growth is threatened by a jobless recovery, massive budget and trade imbalances and rising protectionist sentiment. Not necessarily a pretty picture, I suppose.
There are, however, a few perennial sources of threat that are now more quiescent. Moscow is generally playing a more constructive role in a variety of serious issues, such as nuclear proliferation, the conflict in Iraq and with North Korea; and US/China relations, of which we will hear more in a moment, are relatively stable - based on a loose partnership in the war against terror and close commercial ties.
Now this leads us to certain assumptions and variables on which we've based the scenarios, which I will run through very briefly. Despite these major changes and threats that I've noted, there are certain fundamental aspects of US foreign and security policy that we can assume will continue during the next three to five years. Even a military and fiscally overstretched United States will seek to maintain global military dominance and seek to prevent the emergence of any serious competitor or indeed a combination of competitors. They will do this through massive investment in military technology and advanced weapons systems in particular. Counter-terrorism both offensive and defensive and also preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will remain at the top of the list of US foreign policy priorities. The United States will also remain the prime reactor in the Middle East region, the Korean Peninsula and within Latin America. And I think whoever is elected President in 2004, Washington will continue to seek to set the International agenda, whether on political security or economic issues and it generally will succeed in doing so.
So that leads us then to the three scenarios on the basis of these various risks, challenges and assumptions that I have laid out. Three to five year scenarios have been drawn up based on extensive consultation from various contributors, including myself, to Oxford Analytica and I am going to lay out these in the remaining time that I have. A word of caution however, before I launch into this. These scenarios are intended to be representative of broad alternative futures; they could be envisioned from broadly different sets of US policies and a selected set of major variables. We are not saying this is exactly what is going to happen. Many other combinations of policies and international and domestic conditions could also be imagined. Now all three of these scenarios assume that US policy makers will face severe military, economic and security challenges, whatever policies they decide to pursue. A return to a more multi-lateral US approach, which is likely, cannot in itself overcome these challenges but we do think it can moderate them. Under any administration the United States is likely to eschew the strong unilateralism of the period from 2001 to 2003.
The first scenario, which is the most positive of the three, is largely premised on the success of US foreign objectives and the re-election of President George Bush in November 2004. Now this scenario would reflect the vindication of the Bush administration's view that US and global security and a stable international order can only be maintained by strong American leadership in world affairs. What are commonly called unilateralist initiatives that can overcome the inertia among its various allies and other major powers. The United States will continue to struggle with the problem of imperial overstretch but a moderately revived US economy will actually ease budgetary constraints on US foreign policy. The centrepiece of this first scenario is sufficient progress of the Bush administration efforts to stabilize Iraq, in part as a result of decisions by France, Germany, Russia and other powers that opposed the invasion in the first place, that their own national self-interest is best served by co-operating with and materially supporting US policy goals. There will be internal stresses continuing in both Iraq and Afghanistan but generally US and international influence will remain strong enough to keep them at levels that are manageable and do not fundamentally threaten US interests and regional stability. Strengthened anti-terrorist measures and international co-operation will have largely broken the back of Al Qaida and its allies within this scenario. But Islamic forces will continue to gain headway in the Sunni-Arab world. US anti-terrorism measures will substantially succeed in protecting the US homeland, but the United States and US interests will remain a target of Islamist and terrorist hatred. With China's co-operation in a policy of cohesive diplomacy, North Korea will once again freeze its nuclear and long-range missile programmes.
So, drawing from the lessons of the first Bush administration within this scenario, a more prudent re-balancing of US policy will take place, which will put more of an emphasis on co-operation and tone down ideologically oriented approaches. What we might call a neo-realism approach, to better appreciate the value of multilateralism but only reluctantly and in the absence of other options and with the continued emphasis on US leadership of these multilateral efforts.
On the domestic side, as I mentioned at the beginning, Bush will win a new term in 2004, based on its perception of progress and success in Iraq and more moderation in its foreign and security policies and a certain modest economic turnaround. The Republicans will also retain control of the House and Senate and will face growing pressures to compromise their emphasis on market and privatisation approaches depressing domestic issues especially healthcare and social security and also to level off their high defence spending. So that's the positive view, scenario one.
Scenario two, however, is rather more pessimistic. Bush will be re-elected within this scenario but not by a substantial margin and we predict here that the Republicans will actually lose control of one Chamber of Congress. Foreign policy failures will actually mount during Bush's second term as the international situation continues to unravel and become more complex. The administration will pursue a reactive foreign policy driven by adverse situations in Iraq, Afghanistan and North Korea and a double-dip recession at home. Renewed efforts to promote multi-nationalism in diplomatic solutions to America's problems and to rebuild alliances will be rebuffed because the US administration will not concede sufficient scope for joint decision making and put too much emphasis still on unilateralism. Faced with low support from its allies the administration will find it necessary to substantially increase the already swollen defence budget to fund an increase in ground forces in Iraq and elsewhere.
There will be failed efforts to viable governments in Iraq and Afghanistan and these will keep US troops bogged down in those countries for many years to come and exacerbate regional tensions. Political instability will grow, for instance, in Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf States as a result of the growing popularity of Islamists. The Islamist terrorist threat will continue to grow as well, although we think it will begin to focus more on overturning established regimes and perhaps less on attacking the US and other Western soft targets.
There will be heightened tensions in North/East Asia, which will arise due to the inability of the Bush administration to gain sufficient support for its coercive policies against North Korea. And, as I say, on the home front although Bush will narrowly win the 2004 election, the Republicans will perhaps lose the Senate and so increased political tensions will come to the foreground over the guns versus butter choices and continued ideological clashes over issues such as healthcare, social security and other domestic issues.
So that brings us to scenario three. In this third and final scenario we are assuming that George Bush will actually lose the election next year and that a Democratic administration will be elected. This Democratic administration will actually re-emphasize liberal multilateralism in foreign policy including renewed efforts to repair ties to NATO and within alliances including the United Nations. The United States will seek to re-balance its relative emphasis on the use of force and international co-operation and also become more domestically focused. So in US policy the Middle East will remain in turmoil but instability in Iraq and also in Afghanistan will become more manageable and internationalized within this scenario. Both countries will remain dependent on international support but Iraqi finances, for example, will be increasingly boosted by expanded oil exports. Due to political reform in Iran the US administration will begin to take on a less hostile more co-operative policy with Tehran. Washington will also remain committed to cohesive diplomacy towards North Korea including a more balanced package of punitive measures but also positive incentives and the administration will begin a gradual reduction in defence spending in line with the more multilateral foreign policy and re-emphasized domestic social and economic priorities.
So on the domestic front then, in addition to winning the 2004 Presidential election, we think within this scenario the Democrats will take control of the Senate by a slight margin and Democratic social priorities will come back to the foreground. This, of course, will cause great budgetary difficulties and many difficult choices to be made, again with the guns and butter issues coming to the foreground but we expect that there will be a shift in spending priorities away from defence more onto the domestic side of things.
So these are three possible futures for the United States. Which of them is more probable? I will perhaps leave that to you but if I can just leave a few thoughts on which I think will be the most probable of these. Since I have a healthy degree of pessimism about the prospects for US foreign policy, I think actually scenario two is probably the most likely particularly given the unpredictability of world events in the current climate. Secondly, perhaps, given that Bush has essentially staked his own creditability on success in Iraq it is more than possible that he will, in fact, lose next year's election based mostly on that issue. And so the third scenario perhaps is the second most likely of those that we have laid out. But perhaps our hope should be, I suppose, that the international situation will become more manageable and the future more akin to scenario one will actually play out in the coming years. So I leave on a slightly more optimistic note.
Thank you.
