Prospects for China's politics in 2012

Analysis

The hand over of political power to a fifth generation leadership is being managed behind the scenes so that it appears to pass off smoothly, and so that the new elite is configured to ensure the ruling structure holds together in coming years:

• This means trying to forge a consensus on key policy where perspectives diverge.
• It also means putting together a team of leaders that will function well as a collective, with no single figure or narrow alignment appearing to dominate, which would cost the CCP cohesion at the apex of power.

Xi is almost certain to succeed Hu at the head of the party and Li Keqiang to enjoy promotion by political ranking in the CCP ahead of replacing Wen Jiabao as premier in 2013. Other senior positions may have been decided, but there will be scope for jockeying right up to the point of formalisation of the new appointments late next year. High profile figures such as Chongqing party secretary Bo Xilai, Guangdong party secretary Wang Yang and Shanghai party secretary Yu Zhengsheng are in the running (see CHINA: Bo Xilai tests new style of leadership - August 15, 2011see CHINA: Wang waits in the leadership wings - September 4, 2009). One or two less prominent party-political figures, with proven executive expertise, should make it onto the Politburo Standing Committee, including Wang Qishan, currently vice-premier for financial and economic affairs.

Conservatives in a changing environment

Politics will remain highly conservative and reactive next year, the CCP seeking to avoid all unnecessary risks, and to concentrate on the leadership task at hand. Strains within the party can be contained, but those in society at large will continue to erupt. The authorities will respond robustly against all protests and unrest, real or threatened.

The October CCP Central Committee plenum decided to focus on 'socialist culture' as a policy priority, which suggests a tightening of control over internet and media content, and a continuing drive to shape the narrative of perceptions of China at home and abroad. Beijing will be at pains to characterise the overthrow of authoritarian regimes and promotion of democracy in the Middle East and North Africa -- and putative change nearer to home in Burma -- as irrelevancies for a China that under CCP rule is correctly managed in the best interests of its people.

PLA politics

The military may be more comfortable with Xi than it was with Hu when he took over in 2002, but Hu may want to stay in charge of the Central Military Commission (CMC) for the same reason his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, stayed in post on stepping down as party chief and president -- for continued political influence. Others may want a clean break, forcing Hu out from chairmanship of the CMC. Xi would then want to move to secure the unequivocal loyalty of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to minimise interference from the military in key foreign policy and security areas.

Foreign policy

Beijing will act to maximise its advantages as a rising power, the more so with the United States and Europe looking weak. An embattled EU, with its sovereign debt difficulties, is the easier target. It wants Beijing to help it and will be limping through its crisis well into 2012. China would offer economic assistance only in return for meaningful concessions:

• It will want greater access to Europe and on soft terms.
• It may insist on an end to the EU ban on arms sales.

Although weakened post-2008, the United States has more muscle and will be less inclined to give way to China. An Asia-Pacific power, its calculations are complicated by security relationships that run up against Beijing. The coinciding of the major leadership change in China and a presidential election in the United States will make for more fraught relations between the two next year. China will be an issue in US campaigning; Beijing will respond. Exchanges will be mostly rhetorical, but in some circumstances relations could sour badly.

Other elections will play into political relations next year:

• Taiwan will hold legislative and presidential elections in January. Beijing will then still be dealing with an administration under President Ma Ying-jeou, which it would prefer, or one run by the Democratic Progressive Party's Tsai Ying-wen, which it would view with suspicion (see TAIWAN: DPP's Tsai could capture the presidency - October 21, 2011). If Ma secures a second term, Beijing may start pressing a more political cross-Strait agenda. If Tsai wins, it could become more obstructive, but would also want to keep up its campaign for hearts and minds. Tsai may want to slow engagement with Beijing, but she will not want to antagonise it unduly. Elections for the Legislative Yuan will be read by Beijing as a signal of the balance of forces it considers pragmatic and with whom it can engage or those deemed 'anti-China'.
• Political calculations towards North Korea could shift with changes of administrations in Seoul and Washington. Beijing will want to retain its primary role in the six-party talks process, and will continue to push for its resumption. Pyongyang will put its own interests first, potentially putting it at odds with Beijing as it plays politics during South Korean and US election seasons.

The probability of confrontation in the East China Sea and South China Sea has been increasing. Beijing will not want a flare-up in so sensitive a year, but on current form it risks one. Further afield, China will want to rebuild relations with the new governments of North Africa and improve how it responds to regional instability that has exposed Chinese vulnerabilities. Relations with Russia, Africa and South America have their difficulties; the inclination is to promote the positive, but there are underlying stresses. Burma poses a significant threat to Beijing's geopolitical calculations as Washington and Delhi begin exploring the change in political climate there (see BURMA: Naypyidaw sets new goals but within old limits - October 14, 2011).