After Kim: Tipping Point for North Korea?

An Oxford Analytica Open Conference Call, Tuesday December 20, 2011

Call summary

The potential for serious instability has undoubtedly risen with the death of Kim Jong-il. North Korea's current trajectory is unsustainable and the controversial decisions that must be made will be even more difficult without a strong leader.

Businesses with interests in South Korea must watch North Korea closely for warning signs, not just over the crucial weeks ahead, but also as internal tensions rise inexorably over the coming years.

Foreign governments must plan not just for military contingencies -- collapse of the North Korean state would require the greatest humanitarian relief effort since the Marshall Plan.

Intelligence failure

The context of analysis of North Korea is that the country remains the world's greatest intelligence failure. The extent of the outside world's ignorance of what goes on in Pyongyang cannot be overstated. Even South Korean intelligence only learned of Kim Jong-il's death when the North Korean media announced it. Kim Jong-un's existence was not even known outside Pyongyang until eight years ago, when a Japanese sushi chef employed by Kim Jong-il reported a 'third son' to the Japanese media.

No precedent

North Korea has already managed one succession successfully -- that to Kim Jong-il in 1994, after his father Kim Il-sung died. This time is different. Kim Jong-il was in his 50s when he assumed the leadership, and he had been groomed for the role for some 20-30 years. Kim Jong-un is in his 20s and has had no such preparation. It is therefore uncertain whether the elite will entrust their future to this inexperienced youth.

Can Kim Jong-un succeed?

Kim Jong-un's chances of success are good in the short term (6-12 months). A shared sense of threat will frighten the elite into falling into line behind him. This initial period could even last some 2-3 years.

Ultimately, several scenarios are possible:

Kim Jong-un may turn out to possess the necessary acumen to hold the country together.
He may become a figurehead for other 'powers behind the throne'.
He may be cast aside in favour of another contender.

Korea has no history of power sharing. Collective rule under a figurehead leader (be it Kim Jong-un or somebody else) would likely prove unstable and unsustainable.

The public at breaking point?

North Korea is a different place from the one Kim Jong-il inherited. It suffered a catastrophic famine in the late 1990s and chronic food shortage remains. Information about the outside world now passes with relative ease into North Korea as people cross the border with China, and from South Korea through smuggled DVDs. North Koreans now know how badly off they are compared to people elsewhere. 2012 is the centenary of Kim Il-sung's birth, which will be marked by a huge celebration and an announcement that North Koreans have now become 'powerful and prosperous'. This could stretch incredulity to breaking point and bring about an 'emperor's new clothes' moment.

North Korean politics

Despite the show of unity, there are politics in North Korea. The government's united front is just that -- a front. Competition exists in three dimensions:

Personalities. The Kim family is a de facto royal family, and there may be manoeuvring within the family or even rival claimants to the leadership. Kim Jong-un's eldest brother, Kim Jong-nam lives in Macau and China (implicitly under Chinese protection) and is effectively disowned by the regime for being 'off-message' and for criticising its policies. He might now try to get involved again.
Institutions. The different institutions of the state do have somewhat separate interests. Key institutions are the army, the Workers' Party (which had atrophied until revivified in 2010 by the first party congress in years) and the cabinet (which includes pragmatic technocrats more amenable to economic reform).
Policies. Ideological continuity is almost sacred in North Korea. Hopes for change that would make North Korea 'friendlier' are wishful thinking. Economic reform might happen, giving official endorsement to markets (which in reality already exist), but the nuclear issue is a separate matter. The precedent for what happens to a small, poor country that gives up its weapons of mass destruction is an unpromising one: Libya.

Seoul will watch and wait

As after the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, Seoul has expressed condolences to the North Korean people (but not to their government). South Korea will now watch and wait. It will try to size up the new leadership and work out how to deal with it. It will not seize the 'opportunity' and take rash action in pursuit of a favourable outcome in the North.

The current president, Lee Myung-bak, reversed the 'sunshine policy' of his predecessor and predicated aid on cessation of Pyongyang's nuclear programme. The result was simply that North Korea severed various connections with the South and intensified those with China instead. Lee's successor will be elected in December 2012 (he cannot serve another term). Even if the next president is another conservative from Lee's Grand National Party, they will still soften policy towards Pyongyang and seek to 'woo' the new leadership.

There are few votes in taking a hard line, though a North Korean attack could harden attitudes in favour of conservative candidates. Conversely, the liberal opposition would benefit if it can pin the blame on Lee for any instability in North Korea.

China's role will be decisive

China's role will be decisive. Contrary to media reports, based on Wikileaks, that China would accept a unified Korea under Seoul, this is not what Beijing wants. Re-unification need not imply US troops on the Chinese border -- other arrangements could be made. However, Beijing prefers the status quo and will do what it must to prop up the current regime, however irksome it finds it to deal with. Real instability in North Korea might press Beijing to pick sides, but even then it would be hesitant. Only if faced with complete collapse would China accept some form of 're-unification', predicated on the maintenance of some Chinese influence in the North.

Russia returns?

Russia has renovated a rail link to North Korea, and mooted plans to build a gas pipeline to South Korea through the North. It may perceive itself to have a growing stake in the peninsula.

Washington has few options

Washington too will watch and wait. It does not know enough about what goes on inside North Korea to pick sides. It will not resume aid flows to the North -- currently suspended -- until it has the measure of Kim Jong-un's policies.

Internationalisation -- the greatest risk?

If North Korea became unstable and one faction asked a foreign power to intervene (most likely China or Russia) this could draw major powers into conflict. Seoul and Washington have one set of contingency plans for collapse of the North. Beijing has another. As far as is known, they are not collaborating on joint plans. This raises the risk that they would misjudge each other and come into conflict.

Provocations likely

Provocations are likely, and will more likely take the form of a missile test or a third nuclear test rather than actual attacks on military assets, such as those on a South Korean ship and a South Korean island in 2010.

The past pattern is for provocations to coincide with dates of symbolic significance -- anniversaries, holidays or days when Seoul has scheduled particular events. Kim Jong-il's and Kim Il-sung's birthdays are candidates, as is the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.

South Korean leaders and citizens may occasionally say they wish to 'get tough' with the North, but in reality neither the government or the public have the stomach for large-scale military action, or for strong counterattacks that could escalate to this. Even the conservative Lee responded with great caution to the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong attacks in 2010.

Business as usual

Business continues as usual in South Korea, though with heightened vigilance. The probability of conflict is still very small at present. Even North Korean provocation would be unlikely to escalate into a war. Kim Jong-un's primary goal is to survive and remain in power -- a war would jeopardise this. Warning signs of serious trouble would be the evacuation of families of US forces from the peninsula, and disruptions of operations at the Kaesong industrial zone -- jointly run by North and South Korea -- which have endured past tensions uninterrupted.

The years ahead

Pyongyang will try to play foreign powers off against each other, but insistence on nuclear weapons limits its ability to woo the west. Its greatest challenge may be to avoid becoming a Chinese satellite as its refusal to abandon nuclear weapons prevents meaningful engagement with Seoul, Washington and Tokyo, and drives it ever closer to China.